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TAX AND ACCOUNTING
TAX CONSIDERATIONS OF THE
CONDOMINIUM SPONSOR AND PURCHASER
PAUL E. ANDERSON* AND THOMAS G. CODY "i
Perhaps no other form of real estate ownership has received more
public attention over the past few years than the legal animal known
as the condominium. It is the purpose of this article to examine the
condominium from the point of view of federal income tax conse-
quences to the owner-sponsor, the buyer-unit owner and the condo-
minium itself.
CAPITAL GAIN PROBLEMS OF THE OWNER-SPONSOR
The sale of a condominium involves the sale of real property.
Consequently, among the problems to be faced by the owner-sponsor
is the rather significant one of whether conversion and sale will result
in long-term capital gain or ordinary income. This problem involves
that question of fact which accompanies each development, ownership
and sale of condominium units: Do the units constitute property held
by the owner-sponsor "primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of his trade or business?"' Assume a set of facts: 2
The XYZ Real Estate Partnership, a limited partnership, acquired
the Plancourt apartment project on June 1, 1956. The project, which
was built in 1949 at a cost of $25 million, was purchased by the partner-
ship for $45 million. The project was the sole asset of the partnership
and none of the partners held any other real estate investments. In
1972, the partnership determined that the return on this investment
was not sufficient to justify maintaining the Plancourt apartment
project. Consequently, the partnership, realizing that its profits could
be maximized by converting Plancourt into a condominium, prepared
a plan to offer the apartments as units to the tenants of Plancourt. In
preparation for filing the plan and offering the units, the partnership
*Adjunct Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law. A.B.,
University of Michigan, 1948; J.D., University of Michigan, 1950.
**Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. B.A., Maryknoll
College, 1964; J.D., St. John's University, 1967.
1 See INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 1221(2), 1231(b)(1)(A),(B).
2 This fact pattern depicts the situation between the extremes of (1) outright sale
of an entire property (as a unit) concededly held as an investment for a period of time
and (2) of the subdivision and sale of property acquired with the primary purpose of so
doing.
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increased the size of the Plancourt maintenance and security forces;
hired a corporation, wholly-owned by the partners, to conduct adver-
tising and sales activities in an office located in the project; and con-
tracted for substantial renovation of electrical systems, landscaping
and building exteriors. What result to the partnership, and therefore
to the partners,3 on sale of the units with respect to the nature of the
gain realized?
In examining this question, it is necessary to review briefly (1) the
nature of a capital asset and (2) the somewhat vague rules governing
conversion from investor (capital gain) to dealer (ordinary income)
status. Having done that, we shall examine certain alternative ap-
proaches to the proposed Plancourt conversion and sale to determine
what effect they have on the risk of dealer status. More specifically,
we shall examine the liquidation of investment approach and the use
of a middleman.
The Capital Asset
The Internal Revenue Code defines a capital asset by defining in
sections 1221 and 1231 what it is not, i.e., it is all property held by a
taxpayer other than certain items enumerated in the statute. Section
1221 provides that the following are to be excluded from the category
of capital asset: (1) inventory; (2) property held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's trade or business;
(3) depreciable business property and real estate used in a trade or
business (the Plancourt property);4 (4) certain copyrights and literary,
musical or artistic compositions; (5) accounts receivable acquired in
connection with (1) and (2) above; and (6) certain short-term govern-
mental obligations. Section 1231, which enunciates special rules to be
applied in the capital gain inquiry for business property, parallels
section 1221. Section 1231, as does section 1221, spells out those assets
not entitled to capital treatment. Among them are inventory and prop-
erty held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
business. Thus, under both sections 1221 and 1231, inventory and prop-
erty held "primarily for sale" are excluded from capital asset status. It
is the latter provision, the "primarily held for sale" category, which is
treated herein.
Held Primarily for Sale
The question of whether an item is held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of a taxpayer's trade or business is
3 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 701, 702(c).
4 Id. § 1221(2).
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necessarily one of fact. Consequently, there are no clearly defined
guidelines which can be applied to reach a determination in every
case. Nevertheless, there are situations wherein it is fairly clear the
property is or is not held primarily for sale to customers in the ordi-
nary course of business.
Under the Treasury Regulations, 5 it is taken as a given that a
real estate dealer probably holds real property primarily for sale in
the ordinary course of his trade or business. On the other extreme, it
is equally probable that an individual who is not in the real estate
business and who purchases one parcel of property, holds it for six
years and then sells it as a unit has not held the property primarily for
sale. Difficulty arises where the taxpayer is neither a professional
dealer in real property nor a person who involves himself with an
isolated investment transaction. What is the character of the gain
realized by a non-dealer with a history of purchases and sales? How is
the purchaser of a tract to be treated when he attempts to maximize
resale profit by liquidating his investment in parts? In these trans-
actions, there is a very real question as to whether the "primarily" pro-
scription has been avoided.
The question of the meaning of the word "primarily" was before
the United States Supreme Court in Malat v. Riddell.6 The facts were
as follows: Malat had participated in a joint venture formed to acquire
a 45-acre parcel of land. There was conflicting evidence as to whether
the land was acquired solely for the purpose of development and
operation of an apartment project or whether it was acquired with a
dual purpose of development and/or subdivision and resale, depending
upon profitability. The Supreme Court, rejecting a lower court view
that "primarily" should be equated with the relatively easily met test
of "substantial," held that "primarily" means "of first importance" or
"principally."7 The Court, vacating and remanding,8 stated that the
purpose of the language of section 1221(1) was to draw a distinction be-
tween the " 'profits and losses arising from the everyday operations of
a business' on the one hand . . . and 'the realization of appreciation
GTreas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(b) (1957). It should be emphasized at this point that being
in the real estate business does not automatically preclude capital gain treatment. See
Maddux Constr. Co., 54 T.C. 1278, 1286 (1970), discussed in text accompanying note 16
infra. Again, in Eline Realty Co., 35 T.C. 1 (1960), the Tax Court stated: "It is well
established that a dealer in real estate may occupy a dual role: He may be a dealer with
reference to some of his properties, and an investor as to others .... " Id. at 5.
6 383 U.S. 569 (1966). vacating and remanding 347 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1965).
7383 U.S. at 572.
s On remand, the district court held that the land was not held primarily for sale
within the meaning of section 1221(1). 275 F. Supp. 358 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
in value accrued over a substantial period of time' on the other ...... ,
The Court thus rejected the Internal Revenue Service's view that "pri-
marily" should be equated with the test of substantial purpose. This
latter test would be satisfied (with resultant ordinary income treat-
ment) whenever there existed a not-insignificant resale motive.
The first step in determining the nature of the gain is to recognize
that the presence of two (or more) purposes and the existence of an
intent to resell in the manner most profitable (including subdivision
and resale) will not of themselves cause the asset to fail the "primarily"
test. The question then is not whether there exists a motive to sell the
property in the ordinary course of business, but whether that motive
is principal, major, or most significant. Returning for a moment to
the fact pattern assumed above, does Malat offer us a route to a deter-
mination of the nature of the asset in the hands of the XYZ Real
Estate Partnership? Between 1966 and 1972, it would appear that the
apartment project was held as an investment. It would, of course, be
naive to assume that the partnership did not constantly evaluate the
worth of its investment and review the possibilities of elimination of
the investment at the highest possible profit. Nevertheless, it would
seem proper to argue that during this period the primary character
of the holding was as an investment- not as property held for sale
(primarily) to customers in the ordinary course of business. But what
of the decision in 1972 to dispose of the investment in the most profit-
able manner, that is, to convert the project to a condominium and sell
each of the apartments as an independent unit? Has the "primarily"
test now been met?
The language of sections 1221(1) and 1231(b)(1)(B) does not ad-
dress itself solely to the question of intent at the time of acquisition.
The Code uses the word "held," and thus frames the issue as of a point
in time, somewhere prior to the actual moment of sale. As noted in
United States v. Cook,1° which, although it did not deal with real
property, was concerned with the "primarily held for sale" test:
the critical period for characterization of the property goes further
back than the time of disposition. The property is properly char-
acterized at the time it is acquired for use by the taxpayers in their
trade or business and during the period it is so used. . . . There is
no requirement in the statute that the property be used in the
trade or business right up to and including the date of sale or ex-
change."
9 383 U.S. at 572 (citations omitted).
10 270 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1959).
11 Id. at 729 (emphasis added).
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Consequently, the question is whether the decision to terminate owner-
ship of the project through conversion to a condominium and a sale
of units causes the property then, at the time of decision, to be held
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business.
There is no obvious or even relatively certain answer to this question
although, as noted, it is clear that the mere instant of sale is not the
relevant point to begin the inquiry.12 Some guidance can be found in
the "tests" used in the many cases treating the question of dealer vs.
investor and by examining the facts which cause investor status to be
terminated and dealer status created.
Dealer versus Investor
It is clear that if the XYZ Real Estate Partnership had sold the
property as an entirety, capital gain characterization would probably
result (except for possible recapture of depreciation under section 1250
of the Code).13 The courts have consistently recognized that Congress
intended to afford capital gains treatment in those situations "typically
involving the realization of appreciation in value accrued over a sub-
stantial period of time. . ... 14 Plancourt has been owned for several
years and has been held as an income producing investment. Its ap-
preciation in value is now being realized.
Just as clearly, if the partnership had purchased the project, and
within a short time converted it to a condominium, or had purchased
undeveloped land, and constructed the condominium and sold the
units, there would not be that substantial period of ownership 15 ac-
12 As pointed out in 3B J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 22.138, at
628-29 (1974):
If the taxpayer's situation is examined at the very moment the property is sold,
it will invariably be found that there was an intent to sell, but such a literal
approach would nullify the statutory provisions conferring capital gain or loss
treatment, and would seem to go beyond the legislative intent behind the exclu-
sion involved.
13 Under section 1250, as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969), gain from the sale or exchange of depreciable real property may
receive ordinary income treatment to the extent of the excess of depreciation taken over
what would have been taken had the straight line depreciation method been used.
14 Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Co., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960). See Commissioner v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965), wherein Mr. Justice White states:
Obviously on these facts [sale of stock on the installment method], there had
been an appreciation in value accruing over a period of years ...and an "in-
crease in the value of the income producing property." This increase taxpayers
were entitled to realize at capital gains rates ....
Id. at 527 (footnotes omitted).
15 See Spandorf, Capital Gain Opportunities for Sponsors of Co-ops and Condomin-
iums, N.Y.U. 31sT INST. ON FEn. TAx. 1855 (1973), where the author states:
Thus, it would appear that an acquisition or development of apartment rental
property for relatively quick conversion to cooperative [or condominium] owner-
ship will not achieve long-term capital gain treatment of the profits to be made
1974]
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companied by appreciation in value which would lead to capital gain
characterization. But, the XYZ Real Estate Partnership has held the
property for a "substantial" period of time. The partnership did pur-
chase it with a view towards holding it as an investment. Does the act
of conversion now cause this "investment" to become the equivalent of
a "primarily held for sale" condominium unit?
In Maddux Construction Co.,16 the Tax Court held that a tract of
undeveloped land was not held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of trade or business even though the
taxpayer was in the business of developing residential real estate. In
so holding, the court listed nine factors to be considered in answering
the question of "primary" purpose: (1) the purpose for which the prop-
erty was originally acquired; (2) the purpose for which it was there-
after held; (3) how extensive were the improvements made to the
property; (4) how frequent, how many and how continuous were the
sales; (5) the extent and nature of the transactions involved; (6) the
taxpayer's normal business; (7) the extent of the advertising, promo-
tional or other efforts of the taxpayers in soliciting buyers; (8) the in-
volvement of brokers; and (9) the purpose for which the property was
held at the time of sale.17 These factors are not all-inclusive, but they
give an indication of the type of scrutiny under which the courts will
place the transaction.'8
by the sponsor. It is suggested that the ownership of the apartment house obtain
the earmarks of a long-term holding period before being offered to its tenants.
Id. at 1863.
1654 T.C. 1278, 1284 (1970).
171d. at 1284.
18 In Brandenburger v. United States, No. S-1377, S-1496, 73-1 U.S. Tax Gas. f 9316
(E.D. Cal. 1972), the court, in instructing the jury, stated that the jury should consider the
following in determining whether the property was held primarily for sale or primarily
for investment:
1. The nature and purpose of their acquisitions of the properties.
2. The period of time during which the properties were held.
3. The use to which the properties were put during the period of ownership.
4. The extent of the developments and improvements made to the properties
in order to ready them for sale.
5. The extent of any advertising campaign to promote sales.
6. The use of a business office by the plaintiffs for the sale of the properties.
7. The character and degree of supervision or control exercised by the plaintiffs
over any representative selling the properties.
8. The time and effort the plaintiffs devoted to the sales of the properties.
9. The vocations of the plaintiffs at the time of the sales and prior and sub-
sequent thereto.
10. The activities of the plaintiffs in purchasing, developing and selling real
properties before, during and after the years of the sales in question.
11. The number and frequency of sales.
12. The existence of a liquidation intent at the time of the sales.
13. The replacement of the properties sold with additional real estate.
14. The amount of gain realized on the sales in question and whether the
greater portion of this gain was attributable to appreciation in value over the
[Vol. 48:887
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If the general guides set forth in Maddux are applied to the XYZ
Real Estate Partnership, it is likely that the Internal Revenue Service
will argue that ordinary income should result.'9 While all will concede
that the project was not acquired and initially held primarily for sale,
the act of conversion would probably cause the income to be viewed as
period of ownership or was the result of the development and marketing
activities of the plaintiffs or their agents.
Id. at 80, 677-78.
In Eline Realty Co., 35 T.C. 1, 5(1960), the court stated:
The characterization of any particular asset as one held for sale or as an invest-
ment is a question of fact, which is resolved with the aid of certain well
recognized tests, among which are: the intent of the seller with respect to the
particular asset in question; the purpose for which the property was acquired,
held and sold; the volume, frequency, continuity and substantiality of the sales;
the proximity of sale to purchase; and the extent of sales activity on the part of
the seller or his agents. These factors must be viewed in light of all the facts;
no single factor is controlling. W. T. Thrift, Sr., 15 T.C. 366; Boomhower v.
United States, 74 F. Supp. 997. Moreover, while the purpose for the acquisition
must be given consideration, intent is subject to change, and the determining
factor is the purpose for which the property is held at the time of sale. Carl
Marks & Co., 12 T.C. 1196; Richards v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 369; Mauldin
v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 714; Raymond Bauschard, 31 T.C. 910, 917, aff'd,
279 F.2d 115.
For a list of cases, both before and after the Supreme Court's decision in Malat v.
Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966), making the necessary factual determination of "primarily"
or not, see 6 CCH 1974 STAND. FFD. TAX REP. 4729.634.
19The attitude of the Internal Revenue Service towards the sale of condominium
units as opposed to sale of the entity is indicated in a proposed amendment to the
Treasury Regulations applicable to real estate investment trusts. Under section 856(a)(4)
of the 1954 Code, a real estate investment trust does not qualify for the pass-through
treatment afforded by section 857 if it holds "any property primarily for sale to customer
in the ordinary course of business." Section l.856.1(d)(4) of the Proposed Treasury
Regulations can easily be read to imply that the Service views the sale of units as
constituting the proscribed "primarily for sale" activity:
Example (1). Trust M, which otherwise qualified as a real estate investment
trust, has in its portfolio a construction loan for a condominium (single multi-
unit dwelling). The loan originated with the trust and was made in accordance
with prudent lending practices. The security for the loan is a mortgage on the
condominium. After completion of the construction of the condominium, the
debtor defaults on the loan and the trust becomes the owner of the condominium
as a result of a foreclosure sale. The condominium is listed with a broker for sale
as an undivided unit. The condominium is sold to an unrelated party within a
reasonable period of time after foreclosure of the mortgage. . . . [The trust
is not considered to have held the condominium primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of its trade or business merely because of the circum-
stances under which the foreclosure was made and the property was sold.
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.856.1(d)(4), 37 Fed. Reg. 26,014 (1972).
A similarly restrictive view was espoused by the Service in Rev. Rul. 73-398, 1973
INT. REV. BuLL. No. 39, at 14, again involving real estate investment trusts. In this
ruling, the Service was concerned with whether a decision to dispose of several long-term
mortgages would convert them to "primarily held for sale" property. It was ruled that
where: (1) a trust's investment policy of investing in long-term mortgages has resulted in
a severe imbalance in its portfolio; (2) the trust has a valid business reason for balancing
its portfolio in that the imbalance has affected its access to sources of additional funds;
and (3) the trust has no history of portfolio sales and no intent to engage in further
selling activity, then, a sale of several long-term mortgages for the avowed purpose of
balancing its investments would not cause the mortgages to be viewed as held primarily
for sale.
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resulting from the various "merchandising" activities - sales activities,
extensive renovation and the like. Consequently, the ordinary income
test of profits and losses arising from the everyday operations of a busi-
ness wouid be met. 20 The partnership had (1) increased the size of the
maintenance and security forces; (2) engaged a corporation wholly-
owned by the partners to conduct advertising and sales activities and
furnished it an office on the premises; and (3) renovated electrical sys-
tems, landscaping and building exteriors. Keeping in mind that the
purpose of the capital gain provisions of the Code have been inter-
preted as merely "intending to alleviate the burden on a taxpayer whose
property has increased in value over a long period of time,"21 it becomes
more evident that the XYZ Real Estate Partnership runs more than
some risk of having a capital gains position defeated.
There are, however, certain courses open to the partnership which
can minimize somewhat (although not eliminate) the risks of ordinary
income treatment.
Liquidation of Investment
As noted above, the purpose of the capital gains provisions of the
Code was to afford favorable income tax treatment when a taxpayer
realized income attributable to appreciation in value which has oc-
curred over a substantial period of time.2 2 The liquidation of invest-
ment theory is aimed at emphasizing the fact that there is no statutory
bar to a taxpayer realizing the greatest amount of gain upon disposi-
tion of an investment.
In Joan E. Heller Trust v. Commissioner,23 the taxpayer (who had
a history of real estate activities) was a partner in a real estate develop-
ment partnership. The partnership purchased an eighty-acre tract in
1948 and purchased two additional adjacent tracts in 1949 and 1950.
During the period 1948-1951, the partnership built and sold approxi-
mately five hundred homes on two of the tracts. It was not disputed that
these properties were held primarily for sale. In late 1951, the partner-
ship was incorporated. During the later part of 1951 and into 1952 the
tract was developed and 194 duplex houses were built by corporations
controlled by the taxpayer and his former partner. This development,
which was to be operated as rental property, proved unsuccessful and
in the period 1955 to 1958, 169 duplexes were sold. The taxpayer re-
20 See Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955), rehearing
denied, 350 U.S. 943 (1956).
21 Brown v. Commissioner, 448 F.2d 514, 516 (10th Cir. 1971).
22 See text accompanying notes 9 & 21 supra.
23 382 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1967).
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ported the profits as capital gain, and quite naturally, the Internal
Revenue Service disagreed. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, reversing a Tax Court decision holding that the property was
"primarily for sale property," held that
where the facts clearly demonstrate that a taxpayer held certain
property as an investment, and further show that this purpose con-
tinued until shortly before the time of a sale, and that sale is
prompted by a liquidation intent, the taxpayer should not lose the
benefits provided for by the capital gain provisions. 24
The court felt that the building and rental of the duplexes was an
entirely new business venture which must be distinguished from his
building and sales activities on the first two tracts. Investment in rental
property must be distinguished from subdivision and sale. The court
apparently believed that since this was rental property-an invest-
ment- until shortly before the sale of the duplexes, the decision to
sell reflected an intent to terminate an investment and not an intent
to convert the property into the same inventory-like assets found on the
first two tracts.
In its opinion, the Heller court favorably cited the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner25 as support for
its acceptance of the liquidation theory.26 The court in Municipal Bond
Corp. was reviewing a factual determination of the Tax Court27 that
certain real property sales resulted in ordinary income. Noting that
the Tax Court had limited its consideration of the taxpayer's primary
purpose to the time of the sale,28 the court of appeals stated that the
purpose for which the property was acquired and the purpose for which
it was held must also be taken into account.29 The court thus implied
that "primary" should be viewed in the context of the entire period of
ownership and not merely at or about the time of decision to dispose
of the property. This implication is strengthened by the court's quota-
tion of language used in another Eighth Circuit decision:
In United States v. Cook, 8 Cir., 270 F.2d 725, 729, ... we said:
"There is no requirement in the statute that the property be used
in the trade or business of the taxpayer right up to and including
the date of sale or exchange. The statute contemplates and the
24 Id. at 680.
25 341 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1965).
26 382 F.2d at 680.
2741 T.C. 20 (1963).
28 See id. at 28.
29 341 F.2d at 689.
1974]
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regulations provide for a reasonable time for disposition after the
necessary termination of the property's intended use." 30
That the liquidation theory has become established as a method of
achieving capital gain was acknowledged by the Tax Court in a deci-
sion holding that the taxpayers had not come within this exception. In
S.O. Bynum, 31 the court stated:
Petitioners' position, of course, is that they were simply passive
investors engaged in liquidating a portion of their farm to their best
advantage in order to satisfy their mortgage, after having ascer-
tained that on a single sale of the entire property they would have
realized less than the existing mortgage.32
The court did not disagree with the theory underlying the taxpayers'
position but rejected it "since we believe it is not supported by the
facts." 33 It was noted that the taxpayers had (1) incurred substantial
subdivision costs, including expenses for streets, water, sewerage, drain-
age and the like; (2) advertised the subdivided lots extensively; and
(3) in fact negotiated for and sold each lot themselves.3 4 These were
characteristics not of a person with a liquidation of investment intent
but rather of a person who was
actively engaged in a . . . business - that of selling subdivided
lots . . . and that such property was then held by petitioners pri-
marily and principally for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of that business, and that this purpose was of first importance to
petitioners.35
A reading of Heller, Municipal Bond Corp. and S.O. Bynum leads to
the following basic conclusions. First, a taxpayer who purchases invest-
ment property and holds it for a substantial period of time is per-
mitted to sell that property to take into account the "realization of
appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of time. '36
Second, it is not necessary that this liquidation or termination of in-
vestment be consummated at less than the most favorable price, 37 or
in a single sale of the property.3 8 Finally, it is necessary that the tax-
payer's activities in readying the property for sale be limited to a level
30 Id.
3146 T.C. 295 (1966).
32 Id. at 299 (emphasis added).
33 Id. at 299.
34 Id. at 297-98.
35 Id. at 300.
36 Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Co., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960).
37 S.O. Bynum, 46 T.C. 295, 299 (1966).
38 Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1965).
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far below that which would equate him with one who is in the busi-
ness of selling and who holds his property primarily for sale to cus-
tomers in the ordinary course of that business.5 9 Applying these gen-
eral propositions to condominiums, one commentator" has developed
the following list of factors relevant to application of the liquidation
of investment theory:
(1) the owner demonstrates that his efforts to sell the building to a
single purchaser have been unsuccessful;
(2) the owner engages in no selling activity but rather hires an
independent agent to merchandise the units;
(3) the tenants have previously requested that the owner convert
and sell;
(4) the owner avoids making extensive improvements in connec-
tion with the sale of the units;
(5) the owner has maintained his investment in the building for a
substantial period of time prior to conversion and sale; and
(6) the proceeds of the sales are not reinvested in real estate or real
estate business.
Applying these tests to the conversion and sale of the hypothetical
Plancourt units, the liquidation of investment approach would prob-
ably be unavailable unless the partnership eliminated from its plan
the increase in maintenance and security forces, the use of a wholly-
owned corporation as sales and advertising agent and the substantial
renovations of electrical systems, landscaping and building exteriors.
Use of an Independent, Nonrelated Middleman
As previously discussed,41 capital gain treatment will result if the
transaction involved merely represents the realization of appreciation
in value of property which has been held for a substantial period of
time.42 An outright sale of Plancourt would meet this test. This secur-
ing of capital gain treatment, however, brings with it a probable reduc-
tion in total profit since the maximization of gain usually available on
a sale of units is surrendered. Consequently, the question arises as
to whether a route can be taken which combines a lessened risk of
ordinary income with an increased profit potential. The use of an
independent, nonrelated middleman may afford such an opportunity.
Basically, the transaction would be structured as follows: The XYZ
89 S.O. Bynum, 46 T.C. 295 (1966).
40 Shapiro, Commercial Condominiums, 41 J. TAX. 46, 47 (July 1974).
41 See text accompanying notes 13-14 supra.
42 For a treatment of sales to a related corporation or partnership, see Shapiro &
Lemlech, Tax Planning the Condominium Conversion -Analysis of Capital Gain Pos-
sibilities, 1 J. REAL ESrATE TAX. 184 (Winter 1974).
1974]
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Partnership would enter into an agreement with A, the purchaser,
to sell Plancourt. A would be a person who wishes to immediately
convert the apartment project into a condominium and to offer the
units for sale. Consequently, the purchase price (payment of which
typically would involve a non-recourse purchase money mortgage)
would reflect this relatively immediate profit to the purchaser and
would be somewhere between the entity price and the as-converted
price. The pretax realization would be somewhat less than that other-
wise available to the partnership. However, the possible availability of
long-term capital gain treatment could more than offset this loss.
As might be expected, there are several pitfalls which must be
avoided if the attempt to realize capital gains treatment is to have a
reasonable possibility of success. There is the possibility that A and
the XYZ Real Estate Partnership will be viewed as joint venturers43 or
that the XYZ Real Estate Partnership will be viewed as having held
the property "primarily for sale" at the time it was offered to A.44
To minimize this joint venture problem, the XYZ Real Estate
Partnership must actually "sell" the project, and A must actually "buy"
the project. Hence, one hundred percent financing by the partnership
is fatal. A must make a substantial investment of his own and therefore
expose himself to a substantial risk of loss. Additionally, even though
it has taken back a purchase money mortgage (either recourse or non-
recourse), the partnership should not involve itself to any degree with
either the sales activities or management activities of A. A must own
the property in substance as well as in form. A must arrange for ad-
vertising, renovation, repair, sales force, counsel, and the like. The
partnership's sole remaining involvement with Plancourt should be
merely as obligee on the purchase money mortgage.
The second problem involved in the use of a middleman stems
not from post-sale activities but rather from the record made by the
partnership prior to its involvement with A. In fact, this involves the
question of what kind of property was the project when a middleman
first entered the picture. Was the project held as an investment or was
it held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the partner-
ship's trade or business? Consequently, the same questions must be
asked and the same guides applied as are involved in the dealer versus
43 Under section 761(a) of the 1954 Code, such association would be a partnership
for purposes of federal income taxation. Consequently, if A and the XYZ Real Estate
Partnership were viewed as a joint venture, the realized gain on sale of the units would
probably be ordinary income.
44 See discussion of the term "primarily for sale" in text accompanying notes 5-12
supra.
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investor inquiry.45 Clearly, the partnership should not have (1) pre-
pared and/or filed a plan for converting the project into a condo-
minium; (2) contracted for or undertaken substantial renovation or
improvement activities; (3) increased security or maintenance staffs; (4)
advertised the potential conversion; (5) established any condominium
sales force or undertaken any condominium sales activities; or (6)
committed itself to or undertaken any other activity which would
cause the property's sale to A to be viewed as other than a mere "realiza-
tion of appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of
time."46
Conclusion
It is quite likely that any attempt by the XYZ Real Estate Partner-
ship to achieve capital gain treatment in a transaction other than an
outright sale of the project as an entity will be subject to challenge by
the Internal Revenue Service. Consequently, the more the form and
substance of the sale resemble the termination of an investment, i.e.,
the realization of appreciation accrued over a substantial period of
time, the more likely is it that the Service's challenge will fail. Simi-
larly, if the conversion of the project and the sale of units constitutes
more than a realization of appreciation, i.e., more than a relatively
passive liquidation of investment, the Service will probably be success-
ful in its attempt to treat the profits as if they arose from the everyday
operations of a business.
FEDERAL INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES OF UNIT OWNERSHIP
Condominium Unit Used as Personal Residence
The purchase of a condominium unit is the purchase of real
property. If the condominium unit is used by the owner as his personal
residence, he will be entitled to take certain itemized personal deduc-
tions.47 Real property taxes assessed against the unit ownership 48 and
interest paid on any mortgage liability against the unit49 are fully de-
ductible by the condominium unit owner. Unreimbursed fire, storm
or other casualty losses suffered with respect to the unit are deductible
to the extent that such losses exceed $100.50 Similarly, property taxes
45 See text accompanying notes 13-21 supra.
46 Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Co., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960).
47 As in the case generally of personal deductions, the taxpayer must elect between
itemizing them or taking the optional standard deduction. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 144.
48 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 164; Rev. Rul. 64-31, 1964-1 Cupn. BULL. 300.
49 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 163.
50 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 165(c).
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assessed against the underlying land and common areas are deductible
in accordance with the proration of those taxes among the unit owners.
Interest paid on a mortgage liability against the land and common
areas will similarly be prorated. A casualty loss, such as fire damage, to
the common areas would also be prorated among the unit owners and
each would be entitled to deduct his share.
Two exceptions to the general availability of these deductions
must be noted. First, if the common areas are incorporated, the taxes,
interest and casualty loss deductions will be those of the corporation,
not of the unit owners.51 Second, if the land is leased, rather than pur-
chased, the amounts paid by the unit owners as ground rent to the
landowner are nondeductible personal rentals. Moreover, the land-
owner receives the benefit of the property tax deductions and any
mortgage interest attributable to the land.52
If the condominium unit is used as the owner's principal resi-
dence, he is entitled to home owner benefits when he disposes of the
unit. Any realized gain is capital in nature. He may also defer the tax
on the gain realized by purchasing a new principal place of residence
in accordance with the requirements of section 1034 of the Code. 5"1
The new principal residence may be another condominium unit, a
single family residence, or stock in a qualified cooperative housing
project.54 If the owner of a condominium unit is older than 65 at the
date of the sale and has used the unit as his principal residence for
periods aggregating at least five of the eight years immediately prior to
the sale, then he may be entitled to exclude from income all or a part
of the gain realized on a sale of the property even though he does not
buy a new residence.55 The amount of the gain excluded from tax by
51 Contributions to the corporation to reimburse it for the tax, interest or casualty
deductions are not deductible by the unit owners unless the unit owners incur these
expenses themselves. Only the corporation may properly take the deductions. See dis-
cussion of nonprofit corporations in text accompanying notes 75 & 76 infra.
52 The leasehold condominium is a common occurrence in Hawaii and occurs with
some frequency in California.
53The three main requirements of section 1034 are (I) that the property sold has
actually been used by the owner as his principal residence; (2) that a new principal
residence has been or is acquired within one year of the date of sale (18 months if the
new residence is constructed); and (3) that the cost of the new residence equals or
exceeds the adjusted sales price of the old residence. If the adjusted sales price of the
old residence exceeds the cost of acquiring the new residence, gain is recognized to the
extent of such difference. For purposes of section 1034, "adjusted sales price" is defined
as "the amount realized, reduced by the aggregate of the expenses for work performed
on the old residence in order to assist in its sale." INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1034(b)(1).
54Treas. Reg. § 1.1034-1(c)(3) (1970).
55 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 121. This provision is elective, but in any case no more
than one election can be in effect at the same time. Id. § 121(b)(2). The taxpayer must
have actually reached the age of 65 prior to the sale before the section will apply. Rev.
Rul. 68-210, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 61.
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a person over 65 is determined as follows: (1) If the adjusted sales price
is $20,000 or less, all of the gain may be excluded; (2) if the adjusted
sales price is more than $20,000, the owner may exclude from income
that amount of the gain that bears the same percentage relationship to
the total gain as $20,000 bears to the adjusted sales price.56
It should also be noted that where the condominium unit is used as
a principal place of residence and is condemned, or sold under the
threat or imminence of condemnation, the owner has a choice of using
the benefits of section 1034, or treating the sale as an involuntary con-
version to which section 1033 applies.57 Under the latter section, the
owner may defer any gain realized on the conversion sale by purchasing
another principal residence within the two taxable years following the
close of the taxable year in which the condemnation sale occurred.58
The federal gift and estate tax consequences of unit ownership are
identical to those of the homeowner. If the owner is married, he may
take title to the property in the joint names of himself and his wife
without incurring any immediate federal gift tax liability.59 Section
2515, which provides the foregoing exception to the application of
federal gift tax, applies only to the creation of "tenancies by the en-
tirety" in real property.60 By statute, the term "tenancy by the
entirety" includes a husband-wife joint tenancy with a right of
survivorship.61 The fact that one spouse has paid the full purchase
price out of his separate funds is immaterial, unless he elects to report
a gift by filing a gift tax return.6 2 If the election is not made, federal
gift tax liability is not incurred until the tenancy is severed. If severed
by the death of the husband, the full value of the property is includible
in the husband's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. If severed
56 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 121(b)(1).
57 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1034(i)(2). Which section should you choose? Section 1034
permits a reduction of the sales price for "fixing-up" expenses within 90 days of the sales
contract. But the period of acquisition is 12 months (18 months if a new residence is
being constructed). Section 1033 has a two year post-year-of-condemnation period, but
it does not permit "fixing-up" expenses either to reduce the sales price or to be added to
basis. Consequently, if a taxpayer wishes to reduce the sales price by his last 3 months
gardening expense, painting expense, and the like, he would elect section 1034. If he
desires to postpone a reinvestment decision for 2 years, he would elect section 1033.
However, the election cannot be made in the case of "destruction" of the property. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1034-1(h)(2)(ii) (1970). In such a case, section 1033 would autoinatically apply.
55 Section 1033 requires that property which is not held "for productive use in trade
or business or for investment," be replaced with property that is "similar or related in
service or use." That language requires the owner to acquire another residence that will
be used in the same manner as the old residence.
59 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2515.
601 d. § 2515(a).
61 Id. § 2515(d).
62 Id. § 2515(a). By election under section 2515(c) the creation of the tenancy becomes
a transfer subject to the gift tax.
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by the death of the wife, the value of the property is excluded from the
wife's gross estate since it is assumed that the full purchase price came
from the husband. If severed during the lifetime of both husband and
wife, a gift, subject to possible federal gift taxes, will be made to the
extent that the wife receives any of the property, or interest therein, at
the time of the severance.6 3
Finally, since the condominium unit used for residential purposes
is a capital asset, any loss realized on its sale is nondeductible because
the property was acquired for personal and not business or profit pur-
poses.64 Similarly, the unit owner may not take a deduction where the
property was condemned since a condemnation taking is treated as a
sale and not as a "casualty."
Condominium Units Held for Business Use
Where the condominium unit is used by a taxpayer for conducting
a trade, business, or practicing a profession, real property taxes, interest
expenses and casualty losses may be deducted whether or not the tax-
payer takes the optional standard deduction in lieu of itemizing his
personal deductions.6" Other trade or business expenses, such as the
cost of property insurance, repair and maintenance expenses, may also
be deducted.66 In addition, the taxpayer will be entitled to deduct a
reasonable allowance for depreciation. This includes accelerated depre-
ciation of new construction not in excess of one hundred and fifty per-
cent of straight line depreciation on a declining balance method.6 7 If
the condominium unit is rented to others for their personal residen-
tial purposes and the unit is new construction in the hands of the
owner, the deduction is liberalized to include such accelerated methods
of depreciation as sum-of-the years digits and two hundred percent de-
clining balance (double declining balance).68
Assuming the condominium unit is rented to others, whether for
their residential use or for their use in a trade or business (including
63 Id. § 2515(b).
64 Id. §§ 165(c), 262.
65MId. §§ 163-165. These are so-called "above the line" deductions, that is, deductions
from gross income in order to determine "adjusted gross income." If a charitable deduc-
tion is important, a higher "adjusted gross income" is significant since it raises the
potentially deductible dollar amount which is limited to 50% of the "adjusted gross
income" figure. Id. § 170(b)(1)(F).
66 Id. § 162.
67Id. § 167. The annual excess of accelerated over straight line depreciation is an
item of tax preference income which may be subject to the penalty tax imposed by
section 57 of the Code. No corresponding tax benefit, such as an adjustment to basis or
a credit against recapture exposure, is granted the taxpayer.
68 Id. § 167(j). The annual excess is an item of tax preference income that may be
subject to the tax imposed by section 57 of the Code.
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the practice of a profession), a limitation on the deduction of interest
expense will be imposed if the rental terms are such that the relation-
ship is a "net lease." 69 In such case, interest expense is deductible in
full up to a limited amount and thereafter only to the extent of fifty
percent.70 This limitation on the deduction of investment interest is
not on a "per project" basis but rather is a limitation on the aggregate
amount of investment interest.
If the condominium unit has been held for more than six months
and is used by the owner in his own trade or business (including the
practice of a profession), or is rented to others, it constitutes section
1231 property, i.e., property used in the taxpayer's trade or business.
Under section 1231 of the Code, any gain or loss realized on the sale
of the unit must be aggregated with other section 1231 gains and losses.71
Any gain resulting from the 1231 netting computation will be taxed
as a long-term capital gain; while a resulting loss will be deductible as
an ordinary loss. 72 Conversely, where the owner used the unit in his
trade or business or rented it but held it for six months or less, section
1231 is inapplicable and any gain or loss realized on disposition will be
either ordinary income or ordinary loss.73
There may be one exception to the foregoing conclusions. Prop-
erty rented on a "net lease" basis, within the meaning of the section
163 limitation on the deduction of investment interest, should prob-
ably be treated as an investment asset rather than a section 1231 trade
or business asset. Consequently as an investment or capital asset, gains
or losses will be capital gains or losses not subject to section 1231
netting. Treatment of "net lease" rental property as a capital asset
would be beneficial only when a gain is realized on the unit's dispo-
sition. The benefit is due to the fact that any gain would not be used
to offset section 1231 losses for the year. Thus, the probability that the
69 Section 163(d)(4) of the Code defines a "net lease" as a lease of property where for
the taxable year in question
(i) ... the sum of the deductions of the lessor with respect to such property
which are allowable solely by reason of section 162 (other than rents and reim-
bursed amounts with respect to such property) is less than 15 percent of the
rental income produced by such property, or
(ii) the lessor is either guaranteed a specified return or is guaranteed in whole or
part against loss of income.
70Id. § 163(d). The owner of investment property, including property rented on
a "net lease" basis can deduct investment interest (that is interest paid on obligations
to acquire or retain investment property) in full to the extent of $25,000 plus net
investment income plus capital gains (note, however, that the latter then becomes fully
taxable). The excess is deductible only to the extent of one-half.
71d. § 1231(a).
721d.
73 See P.E. ANDERSON, TAX FAcroRs IN REAL ESrATE OPERATIONS 89 (3d ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as ANDERSON].
1974]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
netting process will result in a loss- and ordinary deductions for
each 1231 asset -is substantially increased. In the case of a loss, how-
ever, treatment of "net lease" rental property as an investment asset
would be disastrous. Such a loss would be treated as a capital loss,
deductible only against capital gains (including net section 1231 gains)
and, only to the extent of fifty percent, or $2,000, of the loss, which-
ever is less, against $1,000 of the seller's ordinary income.7 4
TAX ASPECTS OF CONDOMINIUM MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS
Condominium unit owners may enter into an agreement providing
for some or all of the following matters: (1) maintenance of the ex-
terior and all internal common spaces; (2) employment of management
staff and other personnel (or making contractual arrangements therefor)
such as security, janitorial, gardening, repair, T.V. cable, and other
services; (3) arrangements for supplying and payment of heat, light,
water, power, and other utilities; (4) management and operation of
recreational facilities, such as swimming pools, tennis courts, golf
courses, spas, muscle gyms, saunas, and recreational rooms; and (5)
rules of personal conduct applicable to mutual owners living in close
proximity, relating to noise, smells, lights, conduct of a business or
professional practice at home, advertising, and the like.
Management Caretaking and Servicing Agreements Among
Condominium Owners
Contracts among owners of condominium units for the employ-
ment of people to manage, maintain, and otherwise provide necessary
services for the units and common areas create no major tax problems.
In the case of wholly residential condominiums such expenses are
nondeductible. If the condominium is wholly commercial (for example,
a medical-dental building) the expenses are deductible.
Recreational Facilities
The cost of mutually agreed upon operation of recreational facil-
ities and other common areas, represented by property taxes, mortgage
interest and casualty losses, are deductible. Maintenance expenses and
the like are not. However, the exposure to possible nontax liabilities
frequently pressures the unit owners to transfer the common areas and
the recreational facilities to a nonprofit corporation. By doing so the
unit owners hope to limit their liability to their investment. However,
such a move results in an adverse tax consequence because the property
74 INT. RE v. CODE of 1954, § 1211(b).
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tax, interest and casualty deductions attributable to the property con-
veyed are similarly transferred to the nonprofit corporation.75
Another potential tax problem may arise where such ownership is
conveyed to a nonprofit corporation. The conveyance of the property
to such a corporation is tax-free under section 351 of the Code unless
the basis allocable thereto is less than the mortgage indebtedness
against the property transferred. If the assumed mortgage debt exceeds
allocable basis, a gain - to the extent of the excess - will be recog-
nized.76
The operation of the recreational facilities of the condominium
by a nonprofit corporation should result in no adverse tax consequences.
Assuming the corporation operates at a loss, such loss is not deductible
by the shareholders. Moreover, if the corporation operates at a gain,
such gain should be nontaxable if the corporation can qualify for an
exemption as a section 501 (c)(7) recreational club.77 Another more diffi-
cult problem is presented by the recently promulgated Revenue Ruling
74-17, 78 wherein the Service ruled that reserves of a condominium asso-
ciation which exceed expenses constitute profits. Since the Ruling
further provides that a condominium association is not tax-exempt
under section 501(c)(4), it is extremely important that the incorporated
recreational facilities are tax exempt under section 501(c)(7).
Rental of Space to Outsiders
Rental transactions give rise to the most serious tax problem facing
condominium owners whether they participate in a residential or com-
mercial condominium. The problem is a simple one: will the net rent-
als be taxed to an association of owners79 as a corporation? If so, the
7G In order to avoid this transfer of otherwise deductible items, the unit owners
could retain title to the recreational facilities and other common areas and purchase a
landlord's liability insurance policy. The unit owners could then lease the property to
a nonprofit corporation on a net lease basis. In this manner, they would retain the
deductible items and the nonprofit corporation would absorb nondeductible insurance
and maintenance costs. The only significant tax problem caused by this approach is the
limitations on deductibility of "investment interest" provided by section 163 of the Code.
76 INTs. RFv. CODE of 1954, § 357(c).
771d. § 501(c)(7). This section provides an exemption from taxation for "[c]lubs
organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable pur-
poses .... " It has recently been ruled that section 501(c)(4), social welfare leagues, does
not exempt a condominium association from federal income taxes. Rev. Rul. 74-17, 1974
INT. REV. BULL. No. 2, at 11. If recreational facilities are made available to nonmembers
(nonshareholders) for a fee, the corporation may lose its exemption.
Social clubs frequently have this problem. Mr. Anderson has been advised that if re-
ported receipts from nonmembers exceed 20% of the exempt club's gross income, the
social club's exemption will be revoked.
78 1974 INT. Rav. BULL. No. 2, at 11.
79 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7701.
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net income will be subject to double taxation. It will be taxed first to
the condominium association and then to the owners on distribution
of the net amount after the corporate tax.
The condominium owners who rent their units usually do so
through a manager who is under a written contract with the owners.
Generally, the manager is empowered to sign a lease for the owner on
the best terms and conditions that can be arranged. The question arises
as to whether the foregoing arrangement constitutes an association tax-
able as a corporation. Section 301.7701-2 of the Treasury Regulations
sets forth the factors to be considered in determining whether a par-
ticular business venture is to be viewed as an association taxable as a
corporation. The Regulations require an association of persons, a
purpose to engage in business, continuity of life, centralization of man-
agement, limited liability, and free transferability of interests.80 For
the purpose of this analysis, a profit motive among the unit owners
must be assumed. That is, the unit owners decide that part of the
property should be rented out at a profit, but the unit owners do not
incorporate. What result?
Since concededly there are persons who have associated for a
profit-making purpose in order to avoid corporate status, the unit
owners must negate at least two of the four common characteristics of
a corporation: continuity, transferability, limited liability and cen-
tralized management."'
A. Continuity of Life
No one condominium owner can normally sue for partition, ex-
cept in the case of destruction in whole or in major part. A condo-
minium is treated under the income tax law as much a product of
contractual agreement as it is a conveyance of land. Therefore, in the
absence of contrary agreement, death, insanity, or bankruptcy of any
member is not considered adequate to destroy the "continuity of life"
of the association. This is a corporate characteristic. In a partnership,
any one partner can cause a dissolution under the Uniform Partner-
ship Act. In a tenancy in common, any one tenant can normally seek
partition.
How can this corporate characteristic be negated? It would seem
that if the agreement provided for expulsion of a unit owner for cause
with a right on the part of the expelled owner to (1) receive the fair
market value of his unit, or (2) sue for partition, continuity of life
SOTreas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1965).
81 Id. § 301.7701-2(a)(3).
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would not exist.82 The fact that such right would rarely, if ever, be
exercised because of its rather drastic consequences seems to be im-
material under the Treasury Regulations.s3
B. Centralization of Management
The essential inquiry regarding centralization of management is
"who makes the decisions?" If the approval and consent of all condo-
minium owners is required there is no centralized management. On the
other hand, if a group of less than all of the owners has exclusive author-
ity to make all decisions for the business, centralized management is
present.8 4
A board of managers would probably meet the test of centralized
management if it made all the business decisions. Business decisions
are of two basic kinds. For lack of a better expression, they can be
classified as "day-to-day" ministerial decisions and "policy" decisions.
If all "policy" questions are decided by the entire membership, minis-
terial decisions can be delegated to a manager (or board of managers)
as agent without fear of a finding of centralized management.8 5
The question therefore becomes what are "policy" decisions and
what are ministerial decisions. "Day-to-day" decisions are those that
relate to the choice of garbage collectors, gardeners, office procedures,
and similar matters. All other decisions, such as the rent to be charged,
the term of the lease, and the use of the space should be voted on by
the condominium owners either before the execution of the lease or
in ratification thereof. If the vote is taken in ratification of the lease,
the manager should be careful to make the lease contingent upon such
ratification. Normally, neither the contingency nor the ratification is
a problem in arranging a lease.
The more limited the authority of the board of managers, the less
the risk of being viewed as an association taxable as a corporation.
C. Limited Liability
Despite the fact that the unit owners have formed an association,
the available authorities maintain they remain jointly and severally
liable for torts arising from use of the commonly owned property.8 6
82 See id. § 301.7701-2(b)(3). The language of the Regulation is simple: "[I]f the
death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member will
cause a dissolution of the organization, continuity of life does not exist" (emphasis added).
83 Id.
841d. § 301.7701-2(c).
85 Id. § 301.7701-2(c)(3).
86 See Rohan, Perfecting the Condominium as a Housing Tool: Innovations in Tort
Liability and Insurance, 32 LAw 9- COrtEMP. PROB. 305, 308 (1967); Schreiber, The Lateral
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The fact that the owner participates in insurance coverage to indemnify
himself would not alter such a conclusion. Thus, the corporate char-
acteristic of limited personal liability would appear to be absent.s
D. Transferable Interests
Condominium ownership can be established with restricted or un-
restricted freedom of transfer. If totally restricted, the corporate char-
acteristic of freely transferable interests is absent.8
There are several partial or limited restrictions on transferability.
One is a mutual buy-sell agreement under the terms of which each
owner agrees that he will sell to his co-tenants at a fixed price in the
event he decides to sell. Another is to condition any sale upon the
consent of a majority of the owner's co-tenants. Each of these has the
economic objection that the owner is subjecting a valuable invest-
ment either to a ceiling in price appreciation or to the whim of his
co-tenants. A right of first refusal may satisfy these objections. That is,
the other co-tenants have a first right to buy a prospective seller's
condominium unit on the same terms and conditions as he may nego-
tiate with an outsider. If none of the co-tenants wants to buy at that
price, the owner is free to sell to the outsider.
The Treasury Regulations equivocate on the effect of a right of
first refusal. Such a right is not sufficient of itself to make the interests
not freely transferable. The Regulations state that in such a case trans-
ferability exists only in modified form."9 Whether the test of "free"
transferability is or is not met or whether such "modified" transfer-
ability is a corporate characteristic has not been answered by the
Treasury. The Treasury has stated that if "modified transferability"
exists, the corporate characteristic of free transferability has less sig-
nificance in determining whether or not the group is an association tax-
able as a corporation. 0
A way to avoid the problem is to provide that no unit owner can
sell his interest without first obtaining the consent of the board of
managers. If the board has absolute discretion to refuse consent, there
would appear to be no free transferability.
Housing Development: Condominium or Home Owners Association?, 117 U. PA. L. REV.
1104, 1143-45 (1969).
Some states, however, have provided by statute that unit owners shall have no per-
sonal liability for actions of the association or for torts arising from the use of the
common elements. See, e.g., ALASKA COMp. LAws. ANN. § 34.07.260 (Supp. 1971); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 711.18(2) (1969); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.32.240 (1966).
87 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (1965).
88d. § 301.7701-2(e).
89Id. § 301.7701-2(e)(2).
9Od.
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Thus, of the six corporate characteristics thought important by
the Treasury, two are normally present in a condominium association
agreement to rent out commonly owned property at a profit, viz.,
associates and a shared profit motive. It may be possible to avoid the
other four characteristics.
Tax Consequences of Corporate Treatment of a
Condominium Association
A. Ownership of Individual Units
Because the individual condominium units are not held for a com-
mon profit, the gross income and deductions allocable thereto cannot be
treated as part of the gross income or deductions of the condominium
association. Nor would co-tenancy assessments for nonbusiness pur-
poses, such as the maintenance of recreational facilities, be attributed
to the condominium association.
It is recommended that the practitioner sever agreements for the
use and occupancy of individually owned space and for the mainten-
ance and care of non-income producing common space from agree-
ments relating to commonly-owned income producing space. Such
separation should not be essential for the separate tax treatment of the
latter, but advisable to avoid third-party confusion as to the extent of
the common profit-making activities of the co-owners.
B. Co-ownership of Common Rental Property
If more corporate characteristics are present than not in the
group agreement to operate commonly owned rental property leased
out to nonowners, the group agreement will constitute an association
taxable as a corporation. This treatment must be limited to com-
monly owned property (whether held for profit or nonprofit purposes).
As individual unit owners, the taxpayers are acting independently of
one another if each rents out his own unit for business purposes. In
such a case, unit owners are not acting in concert and cannot be "asso-
ciates."' 1 Nor can it include commonly owned property held for non-
income purposes (elevators, lobbies, hallways, garbage areas, and the
like, servicing residential units, recreational areas, ana similar prop-
erties) because even though the common owners are associated, this
association is not for a profit.
The tax consequences of treating the commonly held rental prop-
erty of condominium owners as being held by an association taxable
91 Id. § 501.7701-2(a)(1)(i), (ii).
1974]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
as a corporation are disastrous. None of the condominium owners
would be entitled to deduct his aliquot portion of the interest, taxes,
or depreciation allocable thereto; all of these deductions would be
allocated to the corporate association. The rental income received
would be taxed to the corporate association at corporate tax rates to
the extent it exceeded allocable deductions. Finally, the use of any
funds of the corporate association to pay expenses properly allocable to
the individual condominium unit owner would be considered a divi-
dend to them which would be taxable as ordinary income to the extent
of the association's current and accumulated earnings and profits. 9
2
Nor would the Code provisions dealing with cooperative housing
corporations be of help unless the outside gross rental income is less
than twenty percent of the condominium association's gross income.93
While the term cooperative housing corporation is broad enough to
cover a condominium association taxable as a corporation, 94 the re-
strictive provisions on gross income would apply. Eighty percent or
more of the cooperative housing corporation's gross income must be
derived from its owners. 95 For this purpose, amounts paid by tenant-
stockholders to the cooperative housing corporation to meet mortgage
or other lien payments are not part of the corporation's gross income;
such amounts are contributions to the corporation's capital.96 As a con-
sequence, the amount of nonqualified income from outside sources
will normally exceed twenty percent of total gross income.
If the condominium owners cannot avoid tax treatment as an
association taxable as a corporation, they should consider the alterna-
tive of incorporating for the purpose of renting out the commonly
owned rental space. The property to be so rented should not be trans-
ferred to the rental corporation. It should be retained by the co-owners
and leased to the corporation. Each co-owner should individually sign
the lease as a tenant in common in order to preserve his status as an
individual owner. The corporation should be organized with a minimal
amount of cash, and should then enter into a lease of the rental space
from the condominium owners at a rental measured by the maximum
92 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 316, 301(c).
93 Id. § 216. This section permits a pass through to shareholders of (1) interest, (2)
property taxes, and (3) depreciation to the extent the shareholder uses the property for
trade or business or other profit purposes.
94 Id. § 7701(3). The corporation must have only one class of stock, each shareholder
must have the right to occupy a unit, or no shareholder is entitled to any distribution
of earnings except on liquidation. Id. § 216(b)(1).
95 Id. § 216(b)(1)(D).
96 Cambridge Apartment Bldg. Corp., 44 B.T.A. 617 (1941), acquiesced in, 1942-2
Ctm. BULL. 2; 874 Park Avenue Corp., 23 B.T.A. 400 (1931), acquiesced in, X-2 CUM.
BULL. 21 (1931).
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fair rental allowable to the owners. By this arrangement the owners
will receive their deductions for interest, taxes and depreciation be-
cause they are the owners of the commonly owned rental space. The
corporate lessee should then be able to rent out the quarters on a sub-
lease basis and take a deduction for rentals paid to the condominium
unit owners.97 While these rentals will be taxable to the co-owners,
they will not be taxed both to the rental corporation and to the co-
owners.
CONCLUSION
Condominium ownership gives a taxpayer all of the advantages of
direct ownership of real property in terms of appreciation in value and
deductibility of expenses. The problems of "association" status, loss of
certain deductions and potential dividend treatment can be avoided if
the draftsman of the condominium agreements exercises, due care.
Finally, and this must be emphasized, the tax implications of a pro-
posed conversion and sale of a condominium should not be permitted
to blind the lawyer to the non-tax needs of his clients. While con-
cern for the tax implications of a proposed transaction is important,
it cannot constitute the sole criterion for making or not making a par-
ticular business decision.
97 ANDERSON, supra note 73, at 97-98.
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